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THE NONPRIMACY OF STATUTES ACT: A
COMMENT
Guido Calabresi*
In March 1977 I gave the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at
the Harvard Law School. The theme of those lectures (and of the
forthcoming book based on them, The Common Law Function in
the Age of Statutes)' was the increasingly frequent assertion by
courts of power over statutes in order to counter the "petrification"
of law with which our "orgy of statute making"2 has burdened us.
In the book I canvass many possible approaches and solutions to the
problem, 3 but the one to which I clearly am most partial is the
candid acceptance of the power of courts to treat certain statutes
as having no more, and no less, authority than common law preced-
ents. One may imagine my surprise and delight to learn some
months after I had delivered the lectures of Senator Davies' pro-
posed bill.'
To an academic lawyer the fact that an idea has enough practi-
cal significance to be made the subject of actual political debate is
both pleasing and mildly troublesome. We are not, after all, mathe-
maticians or classicists, and so cannot rest happily in having devel-
oped aesthetically satisfying models or constructs. Of course not.
Yet to have our work tested, too soon, in the furnace of political life
leaves us a little unprepared, a little untrained-even a little naked.
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1. G. CALABREsI, THE COMMON LAW FUNCTION IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (to be published
by Harv. U. Press) [hereinafter cited as CALABREsi].
2. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GILMOREI.
3. I examine: reliance on constitutional adjudication (especially use of the due process
and the equal protection clauses to nullify outworn statutes); Bickel's passive virtues; statu-
tory interpretation; administrative agencies; sunset laws and the indexing of statutes; re-
vamping the legislative system to ease legislative updating of statutes; and a deliberate return
to the legislative-judicial colloquy that is thought to have obtained in the 19th century. I
conclude that none of these solutions can provide us with the balance between continuity and
change for which the common law system is heralded. Cf. Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Haw. 500,
502 (1958), "[Tjhe genius of the common law . ..is its capacity for orderly growth."
4. See Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Non-Primacy of Statutes A ct,
4 VT. L. REV. 203 (1979). Senator Davies' bill proposes that statutes 20 or more years old
without significant amendment or modification within the last 20 years will be subject to
judicial nullification.
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So much the better then, to have an approach closely analogous to
mine be developed and proposed independently by someone like
Senator Davies who combines in a fashion more unique than rare
the academic and the practical.
Before making a few comments on the bill itself and on Davies'
discussion of it, I would like to muse a bit on that extraordinary
phenomenon, the apparently radical idea that is "suddenly" pro-
posed by several writers independently. The history of thought is
full of such occasions. Some of the great ones are well known: when
Darwin was writing, so was Wallace; the Calculus was "invented"
contemporaneously by more than one; circulation of the blood, and
the "Keynesian" theory are other candidates. At the trivial level at
which most lawyers work, I was involved in a similar event some
twenty years ago. A year or so after I published my first article on
tort law,' which caused something of a teapot tempest in its unusual
use of law and economics, a book appeared in Italy, thought out and
written completely independently I am certain, which mirrored my
article even to the point of employing some of the same "practical"
examples.'
Why does this happen? The answer, of course, is that the idea
propounded is in fact not a bit radical; and if one looks closely and
deeply enough, one will invariably find that many others will have
approached it much earlier. But the time for it (in law the need for
it) was not right, and so its full development did not take place.
Still, those "ancestors" do become a part of our culture; and as the
problems-intellectual or practical-which gave rise to the first ten-
tative approaches become more pressing, more and more writers will
tend to find partial solutions which, in fact, tie in to the thinking
of the more remote ancestors. When the egg is finally discovered
(whether trivial or cosmic), it has in fact been laid in so many places
that it would be unusual if only one person found it! And so it is
with this proposal and with Davies', Grant Gilmore's,7 and my sepa-
rate stumbling on to it.
5. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961).
6. P. TRIMARCHI, RIsCHIO E RESPONSABILIrA OGGETIVA (1961).
7. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 97 & 143 n.58.
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In my book I spend some time on the ancestors of the doctrine
and find them to be among the most unradical of thinkers: the
original proponents of the Restatement, Alexander Bickel, early
commentators on the Field Code in California, and so on.' I won't
dwell on those here but rather on the similarity, in gestation and in
sources, of Gilmore's, Davies', and my development of the problem.
I began thinking about it during my clerkship with Hugo L.
Black in the 1958 term of the U.S. Supreme Court (in other words,
precisely when Senator Davies did). What set me thinking was the
Court's extraordinary treatment of the Federal Employees Liability
Act, which was often before the Court in that term. That Act had
been passed to give a group of tort victims (railroad employees) a
better chance of recovery than the ordinary tort plaintiff. As time
passed, and the common law of torts changed and became much
more favorable to plaintiffs, there was a danger that the "favored"
employees would lose that status because their special rights had
been created by statute and hence, under traditional thinking, were
"frozen." The Supreme Court, led by Justice Black, refused to per-
mit this freezing and "interpreted" the (previously otherwise inter-
preted) statute so that it continued to give greater rights to railroad
employees than to other tort victims." Justice Frankfurter was much
upset by all this. He did not doubt that the old FELA law was out
of date, but argued that the way to force an update was not to
"misinterpret" the statute (as he thought Justice Black was doing).
He preferred, instead, to "blackmail" Congress by reading the stat-
ute so narrowly and meanly as to create an interest group which
would fight and die for a legislative review of the issue."' Grant
8. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT ORGANI-
ZATION FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE (1923); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL]; Pomeroy, The True Method of Reinterpreting the Civil Code, 3 WEST COAST REP.
585, 652, 691, 717 (1883), 4 WEST COAST REP. 1, 49, 109, 145 (1884); Harrison, The First Half-
Century of the California Civil Code, 10 CAL. L. REV. 185 (1922); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The
Legal Process (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
9. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
10. "One's deep sympathy is of course aroused by a victim of the hazards
of negligence litigation in situations like the one before us. But the remedy for
an obsolete and uncivilized system of compensation for loss of life or limb of
crews on ships and trains is not intermittent disregard of the considerations
which led Congress to entrust this Court with the discretion of certiorari juris-
diction. The remedy is an adequate and effective system of workmen's com-
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Gilmore's interest in the problem, he has told me, derives from his
writings in admiralty (at about the same time) and from precisely
the same issue which arose under the admiralty equivalent of the
FELA law, the Jones Act."
Senator Davies mentions Justice Harlan's great opinion in
Welsh v. United States" as focusing his views.' 3 But Justice Harlan
decided another case at the very same time as Welsh and used the
same methods: Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.'4 This case
involved wrongful death statutes which demanded judicial expan-
sion. It was squarely in my field and was responsible for my decision
to address systematically the problems I had first posed to myself
in the FELA cases.
No, it is not chance that leads to the development of similar
ideas at the same time. The reason is that, in a fundamental sense,
those ideas are not new but are instead responsive to practical needs
and are-once stated-even obvious. This practical basis for the
ideas is also the source of their power once stated, whether the
society accepts them candidly or, as it frequently will do instead,
reaches the same result while denying that it is doing so.'5
pensation," adequate in amount and especially prompt in administration.
McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 23-24 (separate opinion). It deserves
to be recorded that Professor John Chipman Gray, a legal scholar with social
insight, taught his students fifty years ago, before the first workmen's compen-
sation law had been enacted, that it is anachronistic to apply the common-
law doctrine of negligence to injuries suffered by railroad employees rather
than have society recognize such injuries as inevitable incidents of railroading
and provide compensation on that basis. The persistence of this archaic and
cruel system is attributable to many factors. Inertia of course. But also it is
merely one illustration of the lag of reform because of the opposition of lawyers
who resist change of the familiar, particularly when they have thriven under
some outworn doctrine of law. Finally, one cannot acquit the encouragement
given by this Court for seeking success in the lottery of obtaining heavy ver-
dicts of contributing to the continuance of this system of compensation whose
essential injustice can hardly be alleviated by the occasional "correction" in
this Court of ill-success.
Id. at 538-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
11. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 308-15 (1957); GILMORE, supra
note 2, at 97 & 143 n.58.
12. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
13. Davies, supra note 4, at 206-07.
14. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See also Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the
Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258 (1972).
15. See G. CALABRESI & P. BoBsrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 72-79 (1978) (discussion of subter-
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This is not the place to go in great detail into the similarities
and differences between Davies' approach and mine. Some of them
are of little interest since they reflect mainly the difference between
the academic who is, also, in the best sense, a politician, and the
academic who is, I hope also in the best sense, a theoretician. Others
are, perhaps, more important but would require too much space. A
few comments may, nonetheless, be in order.
In my book I spend a considerable amount of time on the differ-
ence between traditional common-law adjudication and what I call
common-law adjudication in a world of statutes. The common law
tended to strike down old rules only when a court could promulgate
a new rule or when it judged that we all could live without a clear
rule while the courts slowly worked their way toward one. That
approach is probably too limited in a world of statutes. There are
too many statutes which are, in Davies' sense, out of date, but which
courts can neither rewrite nor nullify without giving us a substitute.
Too often a common-law approach leading slowly and indirectly to
a new rule creates too much uncertainty.
In such cases techniques need to be developed which will allow
courts to induce a legislative reconsideration. Such judicial tech-
niques are available and, in fact, have been used (indirectly or un-
candidly) in recent years in the updating of both common-law and
statutory rules.' They present problems analogous to but not worse
fuges). See also CAABRSI, supra note 1, which applies that discussion to the problem of
courts and legal obsolescence.
16. For example, in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513
(1970), the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether plaintiff's negligence should ever
be a bar to recovery in tort actions, in the face of a statute which allowed recovery only if
"such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966). Appellant argued that the initial rule of
contributory negligence was court-created, that it was this common-law rule which still
barred some negligent plaintiffs from recovery, and that the legislature in adopting "limited
comparative negligence" intended no more than to permit recovery by plaintiffs who were
less negligent than the defendant while leaving the common law unchanged as to all others.
But cf. Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 MARQ. L. REv. 3 (1939), (an article by the
draftsman of the bill which casts doubt on this reading of the statute). A majority of the
justices held that the court had not been pre-empted from adopting full comparative negli-
gence. All but one nonetheless decided to postpone consideration of a new rule until after the
legislature, then considering the question, had acted. The clear message was that if the
legislature did not act, the court might. The legislature did act that year, but only to change
the words "as great as" to "not greater than." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1978). See
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than those Davies raises with respect to legislative nonretroac-
tivity. 17 Unless litigants can be given an incentive to urge courts to
force legislative reconsideration of timeworn laws (in those instances
in which courts cannot simply "change" the law in the litigated case
and thereby compensate the successful litigant), the pressure on the
courts to update will be greatly diminished. For the common law
function in the age of statutes to be truly effective, this and many
similar problems must be solved.
Senator Davies' article, I think, may be taken to understate the
extent to which courts today are already doing-in a hidden
way-what he would have them do openly (and not just for twenty-
year-old statutes). I know, from correspondence with him, that he
shares my view about how much judicial revision of statutes is al-
ready going on. My own approach emphasizes these current court
also Lupie v. Hartzheim, 54 Wis. 2d 415, 195 N.W.2d 461 (1972).
In Loui v. Oakley, 50 Haw. 260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968), the Hawaii Supreme Court made a
similar "suggestion." Justice Levinson noted in a footnote that contributory negligence, since
it was a judge-made rule initially, could be judicially replaced by a full comparative negli-
gence standard. Id. at 265 n.5, 438 P.2d at 397 n.5 (1968). The Hawaii legislature promptly
compromised between the old common law rule and the threatened new rule by enacting a
"limited" comparative negligence statute. HAw. REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1976). See also Bissen
v. Fujii, 51 Haw. 636, 640, 466 P.2d 429, 432 (1970) (Levinson, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter's position in the FELA cases, see note 10 supra, can be viewed as a
plea to the court to use a similar technique. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court adopted an analysis comparable to that used by the
Wisconsin court in Vincent, but rejected respondent's argument that any expansion of reme-
dies should be postponed until Congress had a chance to act. 398 U.S. at 405 n.17. Writing
for the court, Mr. Justice Harlan construed the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § §
761-767 (1976), not to preclude the availability of a wrongful death remedy in situations
explicitly not covered by the Act. That cleared the way for the Court to overturn the old
common law rule of no recovery for wrongful death. The court felt free to expand the remedy,
without waiting for Congress to act, in part because it found
numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a whole, [which] make
it clear that there is no present public policy against allowing recovery for
wrongful death. The statutes evidence a wide rejection by the legislatures of
whatever justifications may once have existed for a general refusal to allow
such recovery. This legislative establishment of policy carries significance be-
yond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus
established has become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate
weight not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of deci-
sional law.
398 U.S. at 390-91. In other words, the Court was prepared not only to strike down the old
rule, but at the same time to adopt, in full, a new one.
17. Davies, supra note 4, at 214-19.
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revisions and focuses on the dangers of having courts rework stat-
utes through subterfuges and by misapplying-even bastardiz-
ing-other legal doctrines. The flight to the Constitution, which
Davies properly notes and criticizes in his article, is but one way in
which courts have attempted to fulfill their role as updaters of law
in a world of aging statutes. The other techniques used by courts
involve dangers different from those entailed by overly enthusiastic
constitutional adjudication, but they are just as real. I would argue
that courts, on their own, and by indirection, are starting to perform
the function Davies would give them (and Justice Harlan's opinion
is only one example), but there are real costs which flow from their
indirect way of resolving the problem. 18
In his article, Davies spends much time defending the twenty-
year threshold. I can understand it politically; as a theoretical mat-
ter, however, it could use more defense than Davies gives it. As he
notes, different statutes age at different times. Statutes tend to age
more rapidly if they are in a modern sense "in derogation of the
common law" (that old judicial doctrine for controlling statutes that
do not fit, applied after all mainly to new laws)." Statutes that
skate close to the constitutional line, that are inconsistent with our
deeper, constitutional, legal topography are less deserving of long
term respect than laws which (though they may be silly) in no way
infringe the penumbra of the Constitution. And as Grant Gilmore
has pointed out, statutes which represent the last exercise of power
of a dying majority deserve different respect for a different time
than statutes which are (though perhaps inconsistent with the rest
of the law when first enacted) the early actions of a new and domi-
nant majority.20
It is hard for me to see how mechanical rules for when statutes
18. Compare BICKEL, supra note 8, at 113-98, with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1964).
19. In traditional common-law thinking, legislatures were presumed to seek only particu-
lar results when passing statutes; they were thought to lack intent (or even competence) to
make more fundamental changes in the common law. Thus each new statute underwent a
process of interpretation by courts which often narrowed the scope of the statute's impact
considerably. For a classic criticism of such judicial "jealousy," see Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908).
20. See GILMORE, supra note 2, at 96.
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"age" can be sophisticated enough to treat all these distinctions. It
is precisely for this reason that the "sunset" law approach to judicial
obsolescence is bound to fail. It is far too mechanical.2' The
common-law approach is much more sophisticated. In effect, it de-
cides when a particular law should be subject to sunset, i.e., should
be revised by courts or when legislative revision should be induced
as a result of judicial action. And it decides this on a judgmental
rather than mechanical basis. It is this fact that gives Davies' pro-
posal its great force. Of course, a common law approach to the
sunsetting of laws immediately brings into discussion the whole
relationship between "consistency in law" (the old common-law
engine of change and continuity) and "majoritarian" demands for
distinctions. And that relationship needs more attention than Dav-
ies in his brief article could give to it or, for that matter, than I can
in this comment. I am not convinced, however, that the politically
wise solution he suggests, the twenty-year threshold, (or any non-
judgmental solution) can cope with the problem of when a law is
"out of date"; and I fear that were it enacted courts would simply
continue to destroy "younger" laws by subterfuges or by employing
the constitutional meat-axe!
I could go on and on, and indeed I do in my book, and suggest
other issues which a short article like Professor Davies' cannot treat.
One last one that comes readily to mind is the role of the bureauc-
racy, of the administrative agency, in the updating of laws. That it
has failed is, I think, obvious. That it was meant to play a crucial
role in keeping law current is also indisputable. A full theory of a
modem common law function in the age of statutes would have to
cope with the failure of the agencies and the need-nonetheless-to
21. The "sunset" movement attempts to force legislative reconsideration of statutes
every X number of years, by giving each statute when passed a fixed life span. The difficulty,
of course, is that at a statute's birth one rarely knows what its useful life will be. Too often
"lifespan" depends on factors extrinsic to the statute itself, like technological, social or even
ideological changes. Thus, legislative reconsideration will usually come either too soon-
before a statute has shown its age-or too late. If too many statutes are reconsidered too
soon, "unsetting" will quickly become rubberstamp reenactment. If, instead, reconsidera-
tion as a general matter occurs too late, the problem we have been addressing will remain
and the temptation to find inadequate solutions-like constitutional nullification-will per-
sist. For a recent review of sunset legislation affecting administrative agencies, see Note,
Sunset Legislation: Spotlighting Bureaucracy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 269 (1978).
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incorporate them and their strengths in the process of statutory
updating.
To emphasize those things which Senator Davies' article and
proposed bill do not treat, however, would be to fault the architect
of a great cathedral because he did not design every statue for every
niche. Not only is Davies' perception in my judgment the correct
one, but his treatment of the problem is full of wonderful insights.
His description of legislatures as being responsive rather than self-
starting, for example, is not only accurate but also fundamen-
tal-all the more so because it runs against the mindlessly repeated
"received wisdom." Here, as in so many places (the problem of
legislative nonretroactivity comes readily to mind) his extraordi-
nary capacity to combine knowledge of the world with an academic
sense of perspective causes him to be not only creative but wise.
He has painted a great canvas in its particulars as well as in
its broad conception. If it is true that the Venetian style emphasizes
color and outlook but underplays detail, whereas the Florentine
glories in detail and precision but sometimes shades the broader
vision, Davies' painting combines the best of Venice and Florence.
And that is no mean achievement!
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